

We know that the President has come forward with a request for \$5.9 billion in additional funding. I believe the Congress of the United States will support our fighting men and women. But that is a large bill; about \$5.5 billion is for military machinery, operations and equipment. It was a surprise to many that in the course of that military operation, we were on the verge of running out of missiles; that our munitions supply was questionable; that our supply of spare parts was questionable. Many of us on this floor, including this Senator, have argued that our military has been reduced too much. And now there is a debate underway as to whether the President's request for \$5.9 billion ought to be supplemented to take care of many items that have been overlooked in the past—issues of military pay, issues of munitions, the overall readiness of the United States.

When the distinguished Prime Minister Tony Blair was in the United States last week, I had occasion to talk to him personally and get his views as to what ought to be done in our military action, the NATO military action, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Blair talks about ground forces. I asked the obvious questions as to how many the United Kingdom is prepared to commit, how many the U.S. will be called upon to undertake, and what we have done by way of degrading the Yugoslav forces by air attacks. To his credit, Prime Minister Blair responded that those were all unanswered questions.

Well, before I am prepared to vote for the use of force, I think there ought to be some very concrete answers to those questions. The President of the United States was quoted as saying that he was prepared to reevaluate the question of the use of ground troops because that request had been made by the Secretary General of NATO. Frankly, I am just a little bit surprised that the Commander in Chief of the U.S. military forces is looking to the leadership of the Secretary General of NATO when the United States is playing the dominant role and supplying the overwhelming majority of air power and materiel in our military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It seems to me the leadership ought to be coming from the President. The leadership ought to be coming from the United States. We certainly are footing the bill, and we certainly are the major actor. So if, in fact, there is a justification for a greater authorization by the Congress, that word ought to come from the President, through the leadership of the President, telling us in a very concrete way the answers to the important questions that I have enumerated.

This Senator understands there are no absolute answers to the questions,

but we ought to have best estimates, and we ought to have a very candid assessment from the United States military, who, so far, have been less than unequivocal in their responses as to whether the airstrikes alone can bring President Milosevic to his knees. The answer that is given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, is that the military will be degraded. But there is a more fundamental question which needs to be answered—whether the airstrikes will be successful, or whether the airstrikes will sufficiently weaken the Republic of Yugoslavia so that we at least have an idea, if there are to be ground forces, what the results will be.

But I believe very strongly that we should not pass a resolution analogous to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the President to use whatever force the President deems necessary. I believe there should be no blank check for this President, or for any President. But I am prepared to listen to a concrete, specific plan that evaluates the risks, that evaluates the costs in terms of potential U.S. lives. I am not prepared to commit ground forces without having a specific idea as to what the realistic prognosis will be.

The Senate of the United States passed a resolution on March 23 authorizing airstrikes, but strictly guarding against ground forces. The airstrikes constitute a clear-cut act of war, and the resolution of the Senate of the United States is not sufficient under the Constitution. There has to be a joinder with the House of Representatives. So it is my thought that before any further action is taken, before there is any suggestion of a commitment of ground forces, that matter ought to come before the Congress and ought to receive prior congressional authorization before any such force is used, and that the entire Congress of the United States ought to review the military action that is undertaken at the present time, and that it is in fact beyond the prerogative of the President under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, but it is realistically a matter that is decided by the Congress.

Make no mistake. There are very vital interests involved in the action now being undertaken against the Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO's credibility is squarely on the line. The credibility of the United States is squarely on the line. The activities of the Serbs, the Republic of Yugoslavia, in what is called ethnic cleansing, which is a polite name for "barbaric massacres," is unparalleled since World War II. And there are very major humanitarian interests which are currently being served.

This body has never come to grips, in my opinion, with the square determination as to whether vital U.S. national security interests are involved,

and that is the traditional test of the use of force. But we are on the line; our country is on the line. NATO, a very important international organization, has its credibility on the line. And we must act in a very thoughtful, very careful way after important information is presented to the Congress by the President, because only the President is in a position to answer the critical questions. Then the deliberation of the Congress ought to take shape, and we ought to make a determination in accordance with the Constitution whether the Congress will authorize the executive branch to use force, to send in ground troops, or what the parameters of that declaration would be.

Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 2 minutes 20 seconds remaining.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might speak for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I urge the Palestinian Authority not to take unilateral action on May 4 to declare a Palestinian state. That date, May 4, 1999, marks a period where significant speculation has been undertaken as to whether the Palestinian Authority would make such a unilateral declaration of statehood because of their dissatisfaction with the progress of the negotiations under the Oslo accords. I urge the Palestinian Authority not to take any such action on the grounds that is a matter for negotiation under the Oslo accords, and that it is something that ought to be decided between the parties to those accords—the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

I had occasion to discuss this matter personally with Chairman Yasser Arafat when he was in the United States a little over a month ago when I was scheduled to visit him in his hotel in Virginia, but I had the opportunity to confer with Chairman Arafat in my hideaway.

For those who don't know what a hideaway is, it is a small room in the Capitol downstairs 2 minutes away from the Senate floor; small, but accommodating.

On that occasion, Chairman Arafat and I discussed a variety of topics, including the question of whether the Palestinian Authority would undertake a unilateral declaration of statehood.

I might say to the Chair in passing just a small personal note that when I accompanied President Clinton to Bethlehem in December of last year, I was struck by a large poster which had the overtones of a political poster. It

had a picture of the President on one side with his thumb up, and it had a picture of Chairman Arafat on the other side. It was a political poster. The picture had not been taken with President Clinton and Chairman Arafat together, but it had that symbolism for the occasion of the President's visit to Bethlehem.

I took one as a souvenir. As we Senators sometimes do, I had it framed and it is hanging in my hideaway so that when Chairman Arafat came into the hideaway and saw the picture of himself and President Clinton, he was very pleased to see it on display and insisted on having a picture of himself taken in front of the picture of himself, which is not an unusual occurrence, whether you are a Palestinian with the Palestinian Authority, or from even the State of Kansas, or the State of Pennsylvania.

In the course of our discussions, I urged Chairman Arafat not to make the unilateral declaration of statehood. He said to me that it was not up to himself alone, but it was up to the council.

Then he made a comment that he questioned whether the Palestinian Authority had received sufficient credit for the change of its Charter eliminating the provisions in the PLO Charter calling for the destruction of Israel.

In 1995, Senator SHELBY and I proposed legislation, which was enacted, that conditioned U.S. payments to the Palestinian Authority on changing the Charter and on making the maximum effort against terrorists, so that when Chairman Arafat raised the question about whether there had been sufficient recognition given to the Palestinian Authority for changing the Charter, I told him that I thought he was probably right and that there had not been sufficient recognition given to the Palestinian Authority for that change.

He then asked me if there would be recognition given to the Palestinian Authority if it resisted a unilateral declaration of statehood.

I said to Chairman Arafat that I personally would go to the Senate floor on May 5 if a unilateral declaration of statehood was not made on May 4.

Being a good negotiator, which we know Chairman Arafat is, he asked if I would put that in writing. I said that I would. On March 31 of this year, I wrote to the chairman as follows:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for coming to my Senate hideaway and for our very productive discussion on March 23rd.

Following up on that discussion, I urge that the Palestinian Authority not make a unilateral declaration of statehood on May 4th or on any subsequent date. The issue of the Palestinian state is a matter for negotiation under the terms of the Oslo Accords.

I understand your position that this issue will not be decided by you alone but will be submitted to the Palestinian Authority Council.

When I was asked at our meeting whether you and the Palestinian Authority would receive credit for refraining from the unilateral declaration of statehood, I replied that I would go to the Senate floor on May 5th or as soon thereafter as possible and compliment your action in not unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state.

I look forward to continuing discussions with you on the important issues in the Middle East peace process.

Sincerely,

ARLEN SPECTER.

Mr. President, I decided to make this public comment to emphasize my view, and I believe the view shared by many, if not most, in the Congress of the United States that, in fact, the Palestinian Authority should not unilaterally declare statehood, but should leave it to negotiations under the Oslo accords.

I thank the Chair.

I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMAS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Wyoming is recognized.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I would like to talk for about 10 minutes as if in morning business, if I may.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator is recognized.

Mr. THOMAS. I thank the Chair.

#### SOCIAL SECURITY

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, clearly the discussions on Kosovo are dominating the day and should. But I hope that we don't forget that we do have an agenda that we need to go forward with as well. So I want to talk a few minutes today about Social Security.

Specifically, I would like to talk a little bit about our efforts to protect and strengthen the Social Security system. We have talked about it for a very long time.

It is not a surprise that without some changes, the Social Security program will not be able to accomplish what it is designed to accomplish. Nearly everyone recognizes that we have to do something different than we have been doing. I will, in fact, say that there is not a consensus as to what that "something different" ought to be.

But the goal surely can be shared by most everyone. The goal is to be able to know that we can continue to provide benefits for the beneficiaries and those that are close to being beneficiaries, and at the same time be able to provide benefits in the long run for young people who are now just beginning to have deducted from their salary Social Security payments. I suspect all of us want to do that.

I have a mother who I am concerned about who has Social Security. I have 5-year-old twin grandchildren and I am anxious about their security. That is the kind of issue we have.

I notice today's newspaper expresses relief that we will go forward with Social Security. There was some discussion last week that it would not move.

I will talk a little bit about the lockbox legislation. We are seeking to push through a Social Security lockbox. What does that mean? It means we take that amount of money which comes in as Social Security now and set it aside so that it will be used for Social Security.

Over the years, we have had what is called a unified budget, and all the money that comes in—whether from Social Security, income tax, highway funds, or whatever—goes into the unified budget.

This year, for the first time in 25 years, we have had a balanced budget, but it is a unified budget. If you took Social Security out of that balanced budget, it would not be balanced. Indeed, it would be somewhat in deficit.

We need to understand what that is. Now that we are close to having a unified budget in balance and close to having it without Social Security, now we have an opportunity to do the things with Social Security dollars that I believe we need to do.

The lockbox is designed to guarantee that all Social Security surplus funds will be reserved for Social Security alone. This, of course, has not been the case. It is difficult to do, frankly. We have never had a place to put it. When we have a life insurance program or an annuity program, there has to be somewhere to put those funds so they draw interest. Of course, under the law, the only place they can be invested is in government securities.

They are set aside here, but they are spent. Of course the President is suggesting he would raid the Social Security to the tune of about \$158 billion, after having talked for 2 years about saving Social Security.

I am concerned that the current debate is going to become very difficult: How do we pay for Kosovo? How do we pay for increasing the support of the military? How do we pay for the emergency funds that are in the process of being provided for Central America?

We have budget spending limits which I think are key to keeping a smaller Government, to keeping a responsible Government. When we go outside of those spending limits with emergency spending, it goes from Social Security. Last year, for example, the President insisted, with the threat of closing down Government, that we had to spend \$20 billion in emergency funding. I suppose no one would argue if emergency funds are a genuine emergency, such as weather disasters or taking care of our troops in Kosovo, we are going to do that, by all means. When we start talking about how we build up the Armed Forces, I think we ought to take a look at whether that comes as an emergency or, in fact, comes out of our budget.